



Ακρωνύμιο πρότασης:

DataPopEU

Τίτλος πρότασης:

**Καινοτόμες μέθοδοι και δεδομένα υψηλής ποιότητας για τη μελέτη του
λαϊκισμού και του Ευρωσκεπτικισμού**

**Π4.1 Έκθεση ανάλυσης των δεδομένων (Ψηφοφόροι, Υποψήφιοι,
Εμπειρογνώμονες, Χρήστες PopEUCompass)**

**D4.1 Analysis of the NES data (Voters and Candidates, Expert
Survey, PopEUCompass)**

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There four reports in this deliverable: the first one is related to the study of congruence between voters and elites, the second one studies the relationship among populism and euroscepticism, the third compares congruence and the position of candidates between 2015 and 2019 and the last report is related to PopEUCompass and its users.

1. Exploring Congruence on Left/Right and Populism Dimensions Evangelia Kartsounidou, Maria Tsigkou and Ioannis Andreadis

1.1. Introduction

After the nineteenth century, our understanding of democracy is considerably associated with the term “representative”. Since then, a wide range of theoretical and empirical research in political science is dedicated to exploring the connection between policymakers and the electorate, or in other words the function of representative democracies. The fundamental function of democratic representation is to provide a systematic connection between the policy preferences of voters and their representatives (Arnold & Franklin, 2012; Costello, Thomassen, & Rosema, 2012). Hence, the main essential of any representative democracy is the voters to feel represented, and their representatives to act in accordance with their voters’ preferences (Przeworski, Stokes & Manin, 1999).

The linkage between citizens and policy makers is conceptualised as congruence (Önnudóttir, 2014). The concept of congruence relies on the claim that policy makers should consider the expectations, needs, and wishes of the voters (Powell, 2004, p. 282). Although congruence between representatives and those who they represent is not the exclusive measure of the functioning of the democratic representation; it can be considered as a pertinent starting point (Eulau & Karps, 1977), a key element of political representation (Miller & Stokes, 1963), or an important tool to evaluate the performance of democratic representation (Karyotis, Rüdiger, & Judge, 2014). Therefore, to study the voter-candidate congruence, the scholars measure to what extent the views of representatives correspond with the preferences and orientations of the voters (Freire, Lisi, Andreadis, & Leite Viegas, 2014).

Although many studies focus on the linkage between citizens and their representatives based on the left/right dimension (e.g., Powell, 2009; Belchior, 2010; 2013), some scholars go beyond the left/right scale and use several policy issues to explore congruence of voters and elites. Scholars also use GAL/TAN dimension (Green, Alternative, Libertarian / Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist) examining issues like immigration or European integration dimension (Costello et al., 2012; Hooghe et al., 2002; Karyotis et al., 2014; Mattila & Raunio, 2006; Stecker & Tausendpfund, 2016). Recently, Stavrakakis et al. (2017) examined congruence of Greek voters and elites based on their positions on populism.

Populism is an interesting and ambiguous phenomenon in political science that has been studied a lot as in recent years, especially in the 21st century, many populist parties have emerged, and support for these parties has increased dramatically (Rooduijn, 2018). Populism has most often been examined from the supply-side of politics, as scholarship primarily focused on the ideology and rhetoric of populist movements, parties, and leaders. Most empirical research before the 2010s was based on qualitative approaches (e.g., Betz, 1994; Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2007). Since then, an increasing number of studies take a quantitative approach, as they delve into the study of both the supply- and demand-side of populism by using survey items to measure populist attitudes.

This paper explores congruence at the level of the mass public and the political elites (i.e., candidate MPs). We rely on the party identification of the voters and the political competitiveness between parties and party families, as it is mainly reflected in the left/right cleavage (Sani & Sartori, 1983), economic left/right, GAL/TAN and populism.

After 2009, the Greek party system changed radically, traditional parties lost their power and new parties appeared. This caused many changes in the Greek political spectrum, affecting the linkage between political elites and the electorate. The fluctuations of the level of congruence during the previous decade reflects this rapidly changing period (Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2020). In the elections of 2019 many previously emerged parties disappeared and

new parties burst onto the Greek political scene (i.e., Greek Solution and Mera 25), which may affect the relationship between the voters and their representatives.

The following are the main research questions that this study poses:

- In which dimensions of electoral competitiveness do we observe higher levels of congruence?
- Is the L/R dimension enough to explain congruence?
- How far apart are voters and candidates in terms of their views on populist issues?

We address these questions using a many-to-many approach, as it is introduced by Golder and Stramski (2010), based on data from a candidate survey of the Comparative Candidates Study (CCS), in line with the mass survey of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Below we describe the conceptualization of congruence, the different dimensions that we examine (i.e., the general L/R, the economic L/R, GAL/TAN, and populism), and we form our research hypotheses. In the next session, we present with more details the methods and the data, which we use in our analysis. Then, we show the findings of the analysis, and this paper ends with some conclusions and discussion.

1.2 Theoretical background

1.2.1. Conceptualising Ideological Congruence

There are different conceptualizations and dimensions of congruence. According to Powell (2004), two are the main research approaches to examine the connection of citizens and their representatives: i) ‘procedural representation’ and ii) ‘substantive representation’. The former focuses on vote-seat correspondence. Vote-seat distributions are “the most tangible and easily quantifiable evidence available about the preferences of the electorate and their reflection in the legislature” (Powell & Vanberg, 2000, p. 384). The latter focuses directly on the preferences rather than the votes of citizens.

Congruence varies greatly and significantly depending on the issue at stake (Hurley & Hill, 2003). There is evidence that it tends to be greater for ideological or highly politicised

issues (Belchior, Tsatsanis, & Teixeira, 2016, p. 280). In addition, voters' preferences tend to match more with the preferences of their representatives in important and comprehensible issues; hence, congruence is more likely to be higher for 'salient' issues (Wlezien & Soroka, 2007).

Congruence among citizens and their representatives could be either on an ideological level or on a specific policy level. Usually, research on democratic representation focuses on attitudes and ideology because expecting detailed policy preferences from voters could be too demanding (Lax & Phillips, 2012, p. 149). Moreover, Costello et al. (2012, p. 1228) explain that the ideology operates as a 'shortcut' that allows voters to identify and vote for a party even without knowing in detail its position on all issues. Thus, there is a linkage between the attitudes and policy choices of policy makers; and if this connection is strong, policy outcomes are likely to reflect voters' preferences (Miller & Stokes, 1963).

1.1.1 1.2.2. Measuring congruence

Different methods have been used to position parties and candidates and to conceptualise and measure congruence. In the past congruence was typically studied by comparing the attitudes of voters with what opinion polls or panels of experts considered to be the attitudes of politicians or the positions of parties. These studies have understood congruence as a one-to-one or many-to-one relationship (see Powell, 2009). Many studies, relying on this approach, compare self-placement of voters extracted by mass surveys with positions of parties extracted by expert surveys (Powell, 2006). Although the use of experts to position political parties is not uncommon (Andreadis, 2013; Benoit & Laver, 2006; Polk et al., 2017), it may introduce a series of problems, mainly concerning the experts' judgement (Budge, 2000).

Another common method extracts party positions from party manifestos. Klingemann (1995) was one of the first researchers who studied congruence comparing the positions of parties (extracted by Manifesto data) with the positions of their supporters (extracted from Eurobarometer survey data). The main advantage of this method is the quantity of the manifesto data, in terms of the number of parties, years and countries that it covers. On the

other hand, the idea of using a party's issue saliency to derive its issue position is not easily accepted; manifesto data tend to position the extreme parties closer to the ideological centre, comparing to survey based approaches (Gabel & Huber, 2000), let alone the low issue coverage of a manifesto in some cases.

Another method of congruence research is to use voters as the experts who will position parties. For instance, to estimate the position of the parties Dalton, Farrel and McAlister (2011) calculate the average of the answers given by all respondents of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) when they were asked to place the major political parties in their country on the Left-Right scale. In this approach, the data are collected simultaneously for both citizens and parties (Dalton et al., 2011, p. 27). Although "individual citizens may have imprecise impressions about politics", their aggregated perceptions could be "virtually identical to the Left-Right scores given by political science professors judging the same parties" (Dalton et al., 2011, p. 28).

Golder and Stramski (2010), who used the top 40% of educated respondents in each country, have used a similar approach. Golder & Stramski (2010) introduced a many-to-many approach to conceptualise congruence, re-addressing the classical voter-representative congruence. Arguably, this methodological approach measures more accurately political elites' attitudes and preferences. Dolny and Babos (2015, p. 1278) note that in this approach, congruence reflects "the accuracy of transformation of citizens' preferences in the legislative body as a whole in terms of the similarity between the distributions of citizens' and representatives' preferences".

Finally, many recent studies follow this many-to-many approach introduced by Golder and Stramski (2010) using surveys of elected members of parliament (Belchior et al., 2016; Dolný & Baboš, 2015) or candidates (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017; Costello et al., 2012; Leimgruber, Hangartner, & Leemann, 2010). Two are the most important benefits of this approach according to Andeweg (2011): i) we can measure "representatives' positions in the same way as voters' asking the representatives directly, in a survey, and ii) we do not need to

assume that all MPs or candidates or voters share the same preference and use a single measure of central tendency for their position; “It is an empirical question whether parties or other collectivities are unified or not; it is not a question to be resolved by assumption. For less unified parties, and for parliament as a whole, using a mean or a median, results in considerable loss of information” (Andeweg, 2011, p. 41).

- 1.3. Congruence and different dimensions of political competitiveness
- 1.3.1. The Left/Right dimension

The left-right scale makes it possible to compare the policy-positions of citizens with the policy-positions of the parties or the candidates that represent them (Powell, 2009). The left-right scale is a kind of 'super' issue dimension (Marks & Steenbergen, 2002) able to capture the political issues that are relevant in a given context (Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976). It is a “unidimensional issue space” which is dominant in the literature on congruence, determining the behaviour of political parties and voters (Dolný & Baboš, 2015). In this view, party positions on the left-right summarise their general policy stances (Downs, 1957).

Many scholars interested in democratic representation, use the left-right scale to measure congruence in terms of substantive issue preferences (Freire & Belchior, 2013). “In a single-issue dimension, the position of the median is privileged because it is the only policy position that cannot be defeated by another position in a head-on vote. The further from the citizen median the legislative median is located, the larger the citizen majority that would prefer an alternative” (Powell & Vanberg, 2000, p. 385).

Although the reduction of multiple dimensions into this single one could be problematic, the left-right scale position reflects reasonably the citizens' views in the context of national political debate in most of the countries, shaping the party competition (Walgrave & Lefevere, 2013) and the vote choices of the electorate (Huber & Powell, 1994; van der Eijk, Schmitt, & Binder, 2005). The dominance of this dimension in shaping party competition in most democratic states encourages the comparison of the level and functioning of democratic representation among them (Costello et al., 2012). Many empirical studies have confirmed the importance of the left–right issue in European politics, determining voters' choices in national

and European elections (Thomassen & van Ham, 2014; van der Eijk et al., 2005) while other studies report high level of agreement between voters and their representatives in this key dimension (Belchior, 2013; Costello et al., 2012; Dolný & Baboš, 2015; van der Eijk et al., 2005).

However, the utilisation of a left/right scale captures only specific aspects of congruence between voters and elites (Lutz, Kissau, & Rosset, 2012, p. 1), without covering attitudes, and policy positions on a variety of issue areas such as law and order, immigration or European integration (Costello et al., 2012; Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006). Hence, we should explore congruence beyond the socio-economic conflict dimension (Karyotis et al., 2014). Apart from the Left-Right dimension, also other dimensions play a significant role on electoral competitiveness and political representation. Issue dimensions like the following have been explored in the available literature: redistribution, employment, defence, law and order, participation, foreign policy, attitudes towards borders and currency, post-materialism, environmental protection, traditional vs. authoritarian values, European integration, immigration, and recently populism (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017; Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014; Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006; Lutz et al., 2012; Mattila & Raunio, 2006; Stecker & Tausendpfund, 2016; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1999; Valen & Narud, 2007). Globalization, economic interdependence, European integration, and immigration have nurtured new political conflicts, cutting across existing social classes and forming the new ‘demarcation-integration’ cleavage (Kriesi 2016; Hutter & Kriesi 2019; 2021). The emergence of this cultural-identitarian conflict dimension creates a two-dimensional conflict space, weakening the significance of the distinction, strictly, between ‘left’ and ‘right’. Radical right populist parties have brought the new ‘cleavage issues’ onto their agenda, forcefully exploiting these new political potentials.

Furthermore, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) since 1999 has included more dimensions apart from the general L/R to position the political parties taking into account different ideological aspects. Economic L/R emphasises on economic issues. In this dimension Left stands for a more active role of government in the economy while right means

privatisation, lower taxes, less regulation, a leaner welfare state and in general a more reduced role of the government in the economy. The GAL/TAN dimension is more related to social aspects, such as democratic freedoms and rights. In this dimension, the discrimination is between “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” and “Traditional” or “authoritarian” aspects. The first group is more in favour of expanded personal freedoms (i.e., access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation). On the other hand, “traditionalists” or “authoritarians” usually have more conservative stances towards these issues, being more in favour of law and order, tradition, and stability. They believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.

Relying on the fact that previous studies have found differences across policy areas with some issues generating more incongruence (Holmberg, 2000; Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2020; Mattila & Raunio, 2006; Miller & Stokes, 1963; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1999; Wessels, 1999), we hypothesize that:

H1 The level of congruence between candidates and voters will not be the same in all the sub-dimensions of L/R.

1.3.2. Populism as dimension of political competitiveness

Various theories have been developed from time to time to define populism. Both in terms of content as well as the time of their appearance, the definitions of populism are quite different from each other, with populism being a movement (Lipset, 1963; Germani, 1978), a political style, a discourse (Laclau, 2005), a political strategy (Weyland, 2001), an ideology (Mudde, 2004), a set of ideas (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019).

The concept of populism has taken on both positive and negative connotations. For example, in America (both the US and the rest of America) a positive view of populism has prevailed as it is considered a "progressive construction" or a construction "from below". More specifically, in the USA the word "populism" is often considered directly connected to the existence of a "left political equality". On the contrary, in Europe a negative characterization

of populism prevails - expressed mainly with academics, journalists, etc. belonging to the liberal camp-, which they equate with demagoguery (Müller, 2016).

In the past, Lipset (1963) and Germani (1978) defined populism as a political movement while Weyland (2001), trying to interpret Latin America politics, argued that populism is a political strategy. This theory assumes the existence of a charismatic leader who tries to seize power by being accessible to his/her potential voters, maintaining a direct and unmediated relationship with them.

One of the definitions that received special recognition mainly among scholars of political theory was the one developed by Ernesto Laclau. According to Laclau (2005) populism is a form of discourse, which has as "nodal point" the "people" and divides society into two opposing camps: the "people" against the "elite", the "establishment". The concept of "people" in populist discourse, however, is a construction; populist discourse does not express an already existing popular identity, but rather creates it.

Mudde (2004) defines populism as ideology. He argues that, unlike other ideologies like nationalism or socialism, populism cannot explain all social phenomena. It is a "thin-centred" ideology, which divides the social field into two groups - just like Laclau's view - which conflict with each other, the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite". Mudde's theory also states, "Politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people".

Finally, the populism approach that has gained ground in recent decades sees populism as a set of ideas. This approach (ideational approach to populism), however, goes hand in hand with two previous approaches, that of populism as ideology and that as discourse. Specifically, scholars who support this approach consider that populism is characterised by a specific discourse-rhetoric, which is common in its all forms, from political party speeches to speeches of political movements, sharing a common worldview that is a Manichean division of society into two warring groups, the "common people" against the "corrupt elite". This set of ideas, as Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2019) claim, seem to have an impact on both rhetoric and political practices of populist leaders and mobilise people to support populist actors.

The ideational approach to populism differs from the others mentioned above in terms of the notion that people already have populist attitudes that are in “hypnosis” and are mobilised in cases of “moral hazard” with the help of populist actors (i.e., populist movements, populist charismatic leaders etc.) (Hawkins & Riding, 2010; Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012).

The ideational approach paves the way for studying both the supply- and demand-side of populism by using survey items to measure populist attitudes.

1.1.2 1.3.3. Individual-level studies on populism

Recent scholarship uses survey items to measure levels of populism among individuals. Hawkins and Riding (2010) developed a battery of six Likert-scale survey items to measure the populist attitudes of US citizens. These items were included in the AmericasBarometer of 2008 conducted in 24 American countries. Four of these items, further refined by focusing on capturing the Manichean view of politics and the will of the people, were also included in the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Elections Studies (CCES) and the 2008 Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP) surveys (Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012). Building on these initial studies, many scholars have tested the battery of the six survey items or parts of it, with most of these studies sharing the notion that populism is a set of ideas, thus it can be measured as an attitude (Rooduijn, 2018). Akkerman et al. (2014) tested a similar set of items in the Netherlands but added further items to measure the Manichean dimension of populism as well as pluralism (three items) and anti-elitism (three items). This set of the six survey items has become an important point of reference for subsequent attempts to measure populism, as it appears to cover a relatively broad range of the latent populist attitudes information (Van Hauwaert et al. 2019).

Stanley (2011) designed a set of eight Likert-scale items to measure populist attitudes in Slovakia. These were two items about the homogeneity of the people and the elite, two about the competitive nature of political life, two about the attitudes towards democracy and two about the moral dimension of politics. Five of the eight survey items were unique while three were similar to other studies (i.e., the one referring to good vs evil, the one on democracy and

the one on people's trust). Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) used a set of eight Likert-scale items to measure populism in nine European countries as part of the LIVEWHAT project. Six of these items come from previous studies by Hawkins and Riding (2010) and Akkerman et al. (2014) while two of them are unique and measure European populist attitudes.

1.1.3 Elite studies on populism

Although some of the most fundamental studies of populism focus on elites in a more conceptual and qualitative way (e.g., Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004), some recent studies take a more quantitative approach to examine levels of populism among the elites. Using survey items to measure populist attitudes at the elite level is very useful for the evaluation of the positions of elected officials and political candidates, thereby gaining insight into the within-party differentiation of populism. In this regard, recent studies measure populist attitudes through elite surveys that ask respondents to indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements (Andreadis & Ruth-Lovell, 2019; Stavrakakis et al., 2017; Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017). Findings from these studies show that populist parties score higher in populism than mainstream parties, even when in power as in Greece after the 2015 national election. However, having many years of experience in government (as in Bolivia) may tame the anti-elite elements of the populist ideology of populist legislators. Relying on this evidence, we expect that:

H2 Candidates of governmental parties will have a more moderate stance towards populism comparing to their voters.

1.4 Data and Methodology

This paper uses data from the Greek post-election studies of 2019 held as mobile friendly web-based surveys (Andreadis, 2015a, 2015b), namely the Greek Candidate Survey, part of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) and the Greek Voter Study, part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). CCS and CSES are products of international coordinated efforts to collect data about the candidates who participate at each country's national elections and the voters respectively. Both surveys are conducted via common core questionnaires that are sent to the parliamentary candidates and the voters respectively in the aftermath of the

national elections. The questionnaires include a variety of questions that cover a broad spectrum of politics. Matters like relationships between the candidate, the party and the voters, democracy and representation, recruitment and carrier patterns, issues and ideology and campaigning, are located on the core of the CCS questionnaire. Furthermore, the CSES common core questionnaire includes questions about people's voting behaviour, views on democracy, representation, parties or party leaders, ideology and issues like immigrants, minorities, populism etc. The 2019 Greek election studies questionnaires were enriched with additional populist survey items in the context of the DataPopEU research project for the better study of the populist phenomenon¹.

In the analysis of the candidate survey we use the parliamentary candidates of the following parliamentary parties after the Greek national elections of July 2019: i) New Democracy (ND), ii) Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA), iii) Movement for Change (KINAL), iv) Greek Solution, and v) MERA 25. It is worth mentioning that the Greek Communist Party (KKE) is not included in the analysis because it has always and consistently refused to provide a list of email addresses for their candidates and the candidate MPs did not participate in the survey. Moreover, most of Communist Party candidates do not run personal campaigns, they do not have personal websites and it is arguably impossible to find their personal contact details.

In the analysis of the voter survey we have Greek citizens who were eligible to vote at the time of the Greek national elections (i.e., they were at least 17 years old -voting age in Greece since 2016) and voted for the five parties that constitute the Greek parliament after the 2019 national elections.

¹ The DataPopEU project is a national project that aims to develop novel methods and techniques to collect, process (clean) and analyze internet and big volume data to systematically investigate the significant political patterns of populism and Euroscepticism in the Greek context. DataPopEU is funded by the Hellenic Foundation for Research & Innovation (H.F.R.I.) under the "First Call for H.F.R.I. Research Projects to support Faculty members and Researchers and the procurement of high-cost research equipment grant" (Project Number: 3572) For more information: <https://www.datapopeu.gr/>

The datasets include variables, which enable us to estimate congruence of the preferences of voters and candidates on the left/right dimension (L/R), the economic L/R dimension and GAL/TAN, along with congruence related to populist attitudes.

Both in CSES and CCS there was a question asking respondents to self-position themselves on the L/R scale, where 1 stands for extreme left and 10 stands for extreme right. This way we can measure the positions of both voters and candidates as individuals. Then we can use the position of the respondents in combination with their vote choice (or the party they have stood as a candidate) to calculate the average value of the voters (or candidates) of each party. The same approach applies also to measure congruence on economic L/R and GAL/TAN.

As for populist attitudes, we use a populist attitudes index, which is constructed as the mean value of the fifteen populist attitudes items, in a scale from one to five. The items form a uni-dimensional scale and seem to work across both candidate and voter study (see Tsigkou & Andreadis, 2022). Scoring high in the populist index means that there are populist attitudes. Then we compare voters' index to the candidates' index to see how far apart they are in terms of their views on populist issues.

To measure congruence in the different dimensions, we follow the methodological approach presented by Andreadis and Stavrakakis (2017). Since our data contain the same question: to place themselves on the L/R scale, which was answered by both the voters (CSES) and candidates (CCS) using the same answer scale; we can measure the congruence between the preferences of voters and candidate MPs. We measure congruence evaluating how similar the distribution of their preferences is on the left-right issue dimension. We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test (Darling, 1957) to check the hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the same distribution. The higher the value of KS statistical test, the bigger the distance between candidates and voters. Hence, a zero value in the KS statistical test indicates null distance between candidates and voters, and as a result, the maximum possible voter-candidate congruence. In addition to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, we visualise the

empirical cumulative distributions of the data for both voters and candidates of a party on the same plots, highlighting this way the ‘many to many’ congruence.

1.2 1.5 Findings

In the general L/R scale (Figure 5-1), we observe a significant distance between the candidates and the voters of the left-wing party of the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the centre-left party of Movement for Change (KINAL). In addition, a considerable distance is observed between the candidates and voters of the left-wing party of the European Realistic Disobedience Front (MERA25). Moreover, we observe that the candidates of the left-wing parties of the study place themselves more to the left in the L/R scale compared to their voters. Moreover, the level of congruence between the candidates and the voters of the centre-right party of New Democracy (ND) appears to be slightly low. Finally, the party that exhibits a high level of congruence is the right-wing party of Greek Solution, although it is a new party in the Greek party system.

In the economic L/R scale, we notice a considerable difference in KINAL, compared to the general L/R scale which is in line with our hypothesis (H1). As ECDF Diagram shows (Figure 5-2) there is a remarkable increase in the level of congruence between the candidates and the voters of this party. An increase in congruence is also noticed between the candidates and voters of MERA25. The level of congruence between the candidates and the voters of Greek Solution remains high also in the economic L/R scale. A slight decrease in the distance between SYRIZA voters and SYRIZA candidates is observed in the economic L/R scale; however, the level of incongruence is still extremely high. On the other hand, the only party that displays an increase in the distance between candidates and voters in the economic L/R scale is ND.




Figure 5-1 Congruence on General L/R

In the GAL/TAN scale (Figure 5-3), we observe a high level of congruence between candidates and voters of almost all the parties of the analysis. A considerable difference compared to economic L/R and general L/R in the distance between the candidates and the voters of ND, which decreases remarkably in the GAL/TAN scale. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the distance between the candidates and voters of KINAL also decreases considerably in the GAL/TAN scale, especially compared to the L/R scale but also to the economic L/R scale. The only party that still exhibits a high level of incongruence between the candidates and the voters is SYRIZA. In general, as hypothesized (H1) we observe different levels of congruence between candidates and voters in the sub-dimensions of L/R.




Figure 5-2 Congruence on Economic L/R




Figure 5-3 Congruence on GAL/TAN




Figure 5-4 Congruence on Populism

Finally, we explore the position of each party's candidates in terms of their positions on issues related to populism and the positions of their voters to see how far they are from each other. As Figure 5-4 indicates, the empirical cumulative distribution of ND and SYRIZA voters is considerably higher than voters of these parties, suggesting that voters have significantly higher populism index values than the candidates they support. This confirms that the voters of ND, and SYRIZA score higher on populist attitudes index than the candidates they vote for. This is in line with our hypothesis (H2) that candidates of governmental parties will have a more moderate stance towards populism comparing to their voters (ND has been in power since the Greek national elections of 2019, while SYRIZA was in power from 2015 to 2019).

The median SYRIZA voter scores higher than 3.5, meaning that they have populist attitudes in contrast to the candidates they vote for who score below this threshold. This difference can be explained by SYRIZA's four years of experience in government. Candidates of SYRIZA, after being in power, may not easily adopt anti-elite views while their voters still

have anti-elitist, populist attitudes. Indeed, as the Latin American experience shows, parties with long experience in government seem to moderate their populist attitudes (e.g., in Bolivia) (Andreadis & Ruth-Lovell, 2019). On the other hand, voters and candidates of KINAL seem to be very close in their views on populism-related issues. Finally, the distance between candidates and voters of the two emerging Greek parties (Greek Solution and MeRA25) is also relatively small, which indicates that both candidates and voters are close in their views on populism. Perhaps the voter-elite distance depends on whether the party has been in power, and if so, how long it has been since then and, importantly, how much it has renewed since the time it was in power. Candidates of parties that govern or have recently governed cannot have a negative attitude towards a group to which they belong.

1.6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have used data from Greek post-elections studies of 2019, namely the Greek candidate study and the Greek voter study, enriched with additional survey items on populist attitudes in the context of the research project DataPopEU.

The first aim of this paper was to study the level of congruence between candidate MPs and voters in Greece in 2019 in different dimensions of electoral competitiveness. Exploring congruence in the general L/R can provide us with some evidence about the distance between candidates and voters of the Greek political parties of the study. However, we observe that different patterns occurred when explored congruence in other dimensions.

ND is one of the parties that we observed a relatively high level of congruence between voters and candidates in most dimensions (i.e., in general L/R dimension, but also in the economic L/R and GAL/TAN), except for populism. On the other hand, SYRIZA presented a high level of incongruence in all dimensions, including populism. A marked distance is also observed between candidates and voters of KINAL, in the general L/R dimension. However, this distance became considerably smaller in the Economic L/R, GAL/TAN and populist dimensions in 2019.

Furthermore, the new parties that emerged in 2019, exhibit a high level of congruence. In fact, Greek Solution is the party that we observed the highest level of congruence among the parties of the analysis in all the dimensions, and especially in the economic L/R. On the other hand, MERA25 in 2019 had a considerable distance between their voters and candidates in the general L/R dimension. However, the level of congruence between candidates and voters of MERA25 increased considerably in the GAL/TAN and populism dimension.

Moreover, there is evidence that in almost all the parties, the candidates adopt an extreme position compared to voters in all dimensions except for populism. A very large proportion of voters place themselves in the centre of the left-right scale, while their representatives' preference distribution is more spread out and often two peaks emerge either to the left-of-centre or to the right-of-centre. We have observed that especially the left-wing parties have a significant distance between their candidates and voters, and the candidates place themselves more to the left of the axis, than the voters. However, in the populist dimension, voters of all the parties seem to score higher in the populist attitudes index than the candidates they vote for. Perhaps in this case, the voter-candidate distance depends on whether the party has been in power, and if so, to what extent it has been renewed since the time it was in power.

Adding more dimensions in the analysis seems to be helpful to study and understand congruence in Greece. However, economic L/R and GAL/TAN were not enough to explain congruence in SYRIZA or ND. Adding populism provided useful insights about the perspectives of both candidates and voters in terms of populist attitudes and contributed to further understanding how congruence was developed in Greece in 2019. However, it is worth mentioning that the findings in the populist dimension were more interesting in the cases that the level of populist attitudes is high. For instance, voters of ND and KINAL appear higher in the scale than the candidates they voted for, but they both are placed relatively low, meaning that neither the candidates nor the voters are populist. This was not the case in SYRIZA, where voters appear to have populist attitudes in contrast to the candidates they vote for, who do not.

In general, more light should be shed in order to fully understand how congruence is developed between voters and candidates especially of the two major parties in Greece. Maybe studying the distance between candidates and voters through new perspectives and issue dimensions (e.g., EU dimension or immigration) could help us provide a more comprehensive overview of the electoral competition in Greece.

Studying congruence in Greece, taking into account different dimensions of the electoral competition, could contribute to the comparative research on congruence in an integrated perspective in the future. Using Greece as a case study and relying on data provided by international projects and collaborations this paper aspires to be seen as a starting point to study congruence in a comparative perspective, focusing also on issues related to populism. Constituting an archive with common variables, coding, and data of all the CCS and CSES studies is an important element also for other potential studies in the future. This effort will contribute significantly to a further development of the CCS project, enhancing the comparative analysis and the collaboration among countries, which is one of the main aims of the project. We hope that this work will encourage more researchers to examine further political representation and other issues related to political science.

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2 Unpacking the Interplay Between Populism and Euroscepticism: Towards a New Operationalization

Ioannis Andreadis, Yannis Stavrakakis and Eftichia Teperoglou

2.1 Introduction

Populism has emerged during the last period as a significant political phenomenon attracting much media attention and triggering broader public debates. No wonder it has, simultaneously, almost monopolized academic discussions, either in its particularity or in conjunction with other important rubrics (populism & nationalism, populism & democracy, etc.). Within the European context, especially after the formation of the Euro-zone and the bumpy management of a series of crises (the post-2008 financial crisis, the pandemic, and now war), the last few decades have witnessed rising waves of euroscepticism, which has now led to the withdrawal of one major nation-state from the Union (UK). As a result, it becomes important to study these two phenomena in a way enabling a more comprehensive understanding of their exact relationship.

No doubt, the connection between populism and euroscepticism has been the focus of a set of previous studies. For instance, Pirro & Taggart (2018, p.4) refer to “the unexceptional overlap between populist and eurosceptic politics”. Yet they recognize that “not every eurosceptic party is necessarily populist [...] and not every populist party is necessarily eurosceptic”, concluding that “there is no necessary convergence between populism and euroscepticism”. In an attempt to identify the specificity of the two phenomena before researching the interconnections between them, we see populism as mostly related to a *broader* political concept or logic concerning the operation of representative democracy, which is built around two main pillars (‘the people’ and ‘the elite’) positing an antagonistic relation between them in order to prioritize the popular side (Mudde, 2017; Panizza & Stavrakakis, 2021). On the contrary, euroscepticism is linked to a more *concrete* position regarding (negative) stances towards European integration and the functioning of EU democracy per se (see Rooduijn & van Kessel, 2019; Cossarini, Ruzza, & Berti, 2021). In that sense, populism operates at a relatively higher level of conceptual abstraction (and analytical generality) than

euroscepticism. Harmsen (2010) refers to some additional differences between the two concepts, e.g. that populism can be traced back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries while euroscepticism obviously constitutes a more recent phenomenon that dates from the early 1990s and is, of course, confined to Europe alone as it is conditioned by the long process of establishing strong European institutions (EEC, EU, etc.).

However, as Harmsen (2010) argues, although euroscepticism is not a subset of populism, there may be a strong connection between them: “opposition to European integration has unquestionably been shaped by wider anti-elite discourses, and in turn has served to reshape these discourses – as well as the parties which deploy them”. In addition, focusing on Hungary and Poland, Csehi and Zgut (2021) show that in Orbán’s and Kaczyński’s discourses “the EU is equated with ‘the corrupt elite’ that stands in conflict with ‘the pure people’, the Hungarians and Poles, and [...] the EU is claimed to act against the notion of popular sovereignty”. Given the ongoing debate regarding the extent to which leaders like Orban can be designated as predominantly populist or not (see Kim, 2021), it is important to note that – if populism predominantly involves an anti-establishment discourse, and if the European Union constitutes the established structure within which the lives of European citizens evolve –, it is probably to be expected that the latter is bound to figure (and be constructed/framed) as a main representative of the elite that populism usually attacks (see Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, et al., 2017), especially given the ‘democratic deficit’ characteristic of its operation, recently described – even by people like Habermas – as a post-democratic orientation (see Crouch, 2004; Habermas, 2013).

All that calls for a rigorous mapping and examination of the relationship between the two. How could political analysis proceed on this front? For many years studies on populism and euroscepticism operated predominantly on the basis of applying text analysis methods on party manifestos and speeches by party leaders. Only recently, there have been studies that try to cover both the supply and the demand side of populism and euroscepticism by including batteries of items in survey questionnaires, while there is also an increasing number of expert surveys focusing on both research directions.

It is within this context that the DATAPOPEU Research Project (funded by the Hellenic Foundation for Research & Innovation) attempts to illuminate the interplay between populism and euroscepticism. The main aim of this paper is to offer an empirical investigation with fresh data on the two phenomena. We focus our analysis on the demand-side of electoral competition in the case of Greece by employing comprehensive batteries of questions for measuring the two concepts. Greece may represent a unique laboratory for analyzing both populism and euroscepticism. Since the onset of the economic crisis, the country moved from the group of reliably pro-European countries to the Eurosceptic group, at least during the peak of the economic crisis. The sharp decline of pro-EU sentiment among Greek citizens can be attributed to the austerity measures attached to the loan deals, which were widely construed as externally imposed by EU institutions (Teperoglou & Belchior, 2020). In addition, the country is well-suited for a study of populism. It has a long tradition of populist politics which goes back to the 1980s and the socialist PASOK's (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) ascend to power. Moreover, the study of Greek populism has received considerable scholarly attention due to the electoral success of parties such as the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the radical-right party of Independent Greeks (ANEL) (see Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, among others).

Within this context, a central objective of the paper is to discuss, on the basis of consistent conceptual clarifications, the survey items that have been used in DATAPOPEU, a research project that develops novel methods and techniques to collect, process and analyze data to systematically investigate the significant political patterns of populism and euroscepticism in the Greek context. In this paper we use the DATAPOPEU data of ELNES 2019 focusing on the items that seem to have worked well in measuring populism and euroscepticism. This is accomplished by creating two indices, one for populism and one for euroscepticism.

A second key question of our paper pertains to the way in which populist attitudes are correlated with eurosceptic attitudes. After constructing an index for populism and another one for euroscepticism, we first examine if these two indices are positively correlated. Then we

attempt a more comprehensive mapping of their relationship and we present factors that may function as moderators (i.e. can cause an amplifying or weakening effect) of the relation between populism and euroscepticism. Our findings are compared with previous studies aiming to provide an in-depth examination and an operational account of this interplay, enabling a more rigorous and reflexive analysis in the future.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly present the main conceptual framework regarding the concepts of populism and euroscepticism. A detailed section about the methodology follows, in which we analyze the batteries of items used in the surveys. The next step is to present the main findings. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.

2.2 Conceptualizing populism and euroscepticism

Needless to say, in order to be able to formulate operational methods (and indices pertaining to a survey research design, as the one utilized in this paper), a clear conceptual framework is required that will allow sufficient flexibility – taking into account the different variants of the phenomena examined as well as their potentially complex interplay. This will also be needed in order to arrive at rigorous differential assessments of a variety of quantitative tools available to the populism/euroscepticism researcher.

With regard to populism, we are today in a position to register a certain consensus emerging in a great part of the relevant political science literature. In this sense, populism is seen as involving a frame/narrative inspiring and partly explaining political behaviour, which is based on positing an antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ within a context conditioned by different – and often deeply polarized – assessments of the quality of democratic representation. Simply put, populism involves (1) people-centrism, and (2) anti-elitism (Stavrakakis, 2017). This is a conceptual basis on which both ideational and discursive approaches seem to be in general agreement (Laclau, 2005; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

Many disagreements, of course, still remain, especially as far as the level of homogeneity of the respective formulations of the people/the elite, the relationship between

democracy and populism, and the extra aspect of ‘moralization’ highlighted by ideational scholars are concerned (see, for a criticism of the latter, Katsambekis, 2022; Stavrakakis & Jäger, 2018) – or, for that matter, other aspects stressed by discourse scholars (affective investment, psychosocial aspects, etc.). We are bracketing, at this moment, such disagreements, but will attempt to illuminate them through the data produced in our research.

At any rate, other scholars also seem to share the emphasis on the aforementioned elements. For example, although starting from a more ambivalent position in the 1980s, even disputing the existence of a ‘reasonably solid core of agreed meaning’ behind all the uses of the concept (Canovan, 1982, p. 544), twenty years later, Margaret Canovan is led to highlighting the same structural characteristics (Canovan, 1999, p. 3): ‘Populism in modern democracies is best seen as an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society. [...] They involve some kind of revolt against the established structure of power in the name of the people’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 3).

Along the lines specified, De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017, p. 310) have summarized populism as:

a dichotomic discourse in which ‘the people’ are juxtaposed to ‘the elite’ along the lines of a down/up antagonism in which ‘the people’ is discursively constructed as a large powerless group through opposition to ‘the elite’ conceived as a small and illegitimately powerful group. Populist politics thus claim to represent ‘the people’ against an ‘elite’ that frustrates their legitimate demands, and present these demands as expressions of the will of ‘the people’

Research around euroscepticism has gained more scholarly attention since the late 1980s as a result of the consequences of market integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Originally, most of the studies focused on elite and party-level positions towards European integration, whereas the study of mass-level euroscepticism - and in particular the predictors

of anti-European stances - gained only recently more empirical attention (see e.g. Hooghe & Marks, 2009; McLaren, 2007).

In one of the seminal studies of euroscepticism, it was traditionally defined as “contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). Most of the literature emphasizes the complex nature of euroscepticism. As Boomgaarden et al. (2011) argued, public euroscepticism may be a multidimensional concept. For the better understanding of the phenomenon some scholars have tried to disentangle its several dimensions (Mudde, 2012), an exercise that has led to the identification of different varieties of euroscepticism.

One of the most well-known distinctions is the one between “hard” and “soft” euroscepticism by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002, pp. 27–28): “Hard euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to one’s country joining or remaining a member of the EU. [...] ‘Soft’ euroscepticism, by contrast, involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration”. Kopecky and Mudde (2002) have criticized this categorization. Among others, they argue that the criteria of this distinction are unclear and particularly the definition of “soft” euroscepticism is vague. The alternative categorization that they suggest is based on David Easton’s seminal distinction regarding the support for political regimes. It is focused on a two-dimensional conceptualization between diffuse and specific support for European integration. More specifically, they define diffuse as “support for the general *ideas* of European integration”, while specific EU support is defined as “support for the general *practice* of European integration” (2002, pp. 300–301). Based on this framework of analysis, they offer a typology of party positions on Europe based on four subcategories. These are: (1) the “*Euroenthusiasts*” who support the idea of European integration and are in favour of its institutionalization; (2) the “*Eurosceptics*” who combine pro-EU stances such as the support of European integration, but at the same time tend to adopt a more pessimistic view about the future of EU; (3) the “*Eurorejects*” who are against both the idea of the EU and the process of

European integration and finally, (4) the “*Europragmatists*” who support the EU in general based on a more utilitarian approach (Kopecky & Mudde 2002). In a similar distinction analyzed by Peter Mair (2007), there are two subcategories of euroscepticism: the so-called *policy euroscepticism* versus *polity euroscepticism*. The former refers to an expression of disagreement with particular EU policies. On the other hand, polity euroscepticism refers to critical positions towards support for the EU as a system and as a consequence, against EU membership as well (for an analysis see also Verney, 2017).

Another study by Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) identifies two main dimensions of euroscepticism. One focuses on the reduction of sovereignty of the nation-state in various policy domains and the emergence of a supranational level of policy decisions. They label this type of euroscepticism as “political euroscepticism”. The other main type is “instrumental euroscepticism”. Here the interpretation is in terms of the actual financial costs and benefits that countries, regions and social categories could expect from the Union’s redistribution policies (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, p. 227).

Finally, another study shows that there are varieties of euroscepticism not only at the party level, but at the mass level across countries. The authors propose a distinction between “left-wing” euroscepticism and “right-wing” euroscepticism. Right-wing Eurosceptic citizens tend to object more against the future deepening of European integration compared to their left-wing counterparts. Moreover, the driving mechanism behind right-wing euroscepticism is more related to cultural issues, whereas left-wing euroscepticism relies more on egalitarian stances towards a better (and more equal) functioning of the EU (van Elsas et al., 2016).

Overall, many perspectives as well as disciplinary angles and many different methodologies are obviously needed in order to arrive at a comprehensive account of populism, euroscepticism and of their multi-level relationship – both at the supply and demand side. A focus on attitudes – such as the one employed in this research – does not necessarily attribute some higher epistemic validity to this method, but may be able to produce challenging results,

which can then be assessed together with other types of data produced through different methodologies (see, on this point, Stavrakakis, Andreadis, et al., 2017, p. 448).

2.3 Methodology and Data

Within this context, we can now move to discuss the methodology which was employed in a modest strategy to capture the interplay between the two phenomena and assess its potential in comparison with other options. In this section, we present the survey items we have used to measure populism and euroscepticism in the DATAPOPEU project. Part of the DATAPOPEU project was data collection for the official National Election Study for the 2019 Greek (Hellenic) National Elections (ELNES 2019). ELNES 2019 data was collected using a mobile-friendly web survey (Andreadis, 2015a, 2015b). Participants were recruited by sending text messages (SMS) to randomly generated mobile phone numbers (for the use of text message in surveys, see Andreadis, 2020). Table 6-1 Populism items Table 6-1 shows the populist attitudes items that have been included in the questionnaire along with their source.

Table 6-1 Populism items

Code	Text	Source
Q04a	What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	CSES AMZ
Q04b	Most politicians do not care about the people.	CSES
Q04c	Most politicians are trustworthy.	CSES
Q04d	Politicians are the main problem in Greece.	CSES
Q04e	Having a strong leader in government is good for Greece even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.	CSES
Q04f	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	CSES-AMZ
Q04g	Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.	CSES
AMZ_POP3	The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.	AMZ

AMZ_POP4	I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.	AMZ
AMZ_POP5	Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.	AMZ
AMZ_POP1	The politicians in Greek parliament need to follow the will of the people.	AMZ
SAK-POP7	Popular demands are today ignored in favor of what benefits the establishment	SAK
SAK-POP8	Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making.	SAK
TP1	Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.	TP
TP2	Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.*	TP
TP3	The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.	TP
TP4	The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.	TP
TP5	Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.*	TP
TP6	Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.	TP
TP7	You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.	TP
TP8	The people I disagree with politically are not evil.*	TP
TP9	The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed.	TP

Given that the questionnaire is used for the Hellenic National Election Studies (ELNES), a partner of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we start with the battery of items used in the CSES Module 5 Common Core Questionnaire (noted with CSES)

that is used to measure attitudes about elites: From the items of the CSES battery on elites, Q04c is expressed in a positive way towards politicians and when it is used in the analysis conducted in this paper, it is reversed.

Two of the items used in the CSES battery (Q04a as AMZ_POP7, Q04f as AMZ_POP2) have their origin in a populist attitudes scale suggested by Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014). This six items battery has been used in various questionnaires and it has been cited in many research publications on populism and populist attitudes. In addition to the two items that are part of the CSES questionnaire, the DataPopEU questionnaire included the rest four items of the Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove scale (noted with AMZ).

We also have two items (noted with SAK) that have been suggested by Stavrakakis et al (2017) as a tool to capture the nature and the depth of the perceived antagonistic divide between people and establishment/elite and have been used in various publications (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017; Stavrakakis, Andreadis, et al., 2017; Tsatsanis et al., 2018). These are potentially important in capturing the scope of the central people/elite antagonism beyond the narrow political field and in highlighting the confrontational attitude characteristic of populism.

Finally, the questionnaire includes items (noted as TP) suggested by Castanho Silva et al. (2019). The battery has three groups of items and according to the authors, each group is used to measure the three "core components" of populist attitudes: i) People-centrism: the notion of a good, homogeneous people as a political actor; b) anti-elitism: negative attitudes towards the elites; and c) the Manichaeian outlook: the view of politics as a moral struggle between good and the evil side. Notwithstanding the aforementioned objections raised against the moralization criterion, this has been included in an attempt to measure and compare different perspectives. The middle items of each group/dimension (marked with an asterisk *) is a negative-worded item i.e. it expresses a position that is on the opposite side of the dimension.

While the literature on populism includes many attempts to create a battery of items to measure populism with surveys, similar attempts on the attitudes towards EU are less common. There are different indicators of Euroscepticism and in many cases the choice was based on the availability of survey items (e.g. Franklin & Wlezien, 1997). One of the few exceptions in this regard is the work done by Boomgaarden et al (2011) who instead of using items already available in surveys, they have created a new battery of 25 survey items related to attitudes towards the EU. Applying principal components analysis on data that were collected with a web-based survey from an online panel of Dutch citizens in November 2008 they have found five components of EU attitudes: performance, identity, affection, utilitarianism and strengthening. Most of the items have been used again in the Netherlands in a four-wave panel survey from December 2013 to May 2014 (de Vreese et al., 2017) and in other cross-national studies taking the five dimensions as granted, before the applicability of the proposed dimensions of this battery have been thoroughly and cross-nationally tested. Only recently de Vreese et al. (2019) have put the battery through dimensionality testing in 21 EU countries and they have found significant differences between countries. In addition, the data they use (collected around the 2009 European election) may be outdated because significant EU crises that emerged after data collection (e.g. the Greek debt crisis and the bailout agreements, the refugee crisis, Brexit) may have changed the structure of the attitudes towards EU.

For the attitudes towards the EU, we have used various items from the Eurobarometer, the European Social Survey, the European Elections Studies and the European Candidates Survey. Most of these items have been used in more than one projects and for some of them it is not very clear which of these projects was the first to include the specific item in its questionnaire. Thus, to avoid doing an injustice to the actual original source, we do not include a “Source” column in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2 Euroscepticism items

Code	Text
DPEU1	In general, do you think Greece’s participation in the EU is: (good thing/bad thing/neither)

DPEU2	Taking everything into account, would you say that Greece has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the EU?
DPEU3	Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion?
DPEU4	Do you consider yourself as: 1. GREEK ONLY 2. GREEK AND EUROPEAN 3. EUROPEAN AND GREEK 4. EUROPEAN ONLY
DPEU5	I feel proud for being European
DPEU6a	How much do you trust the: European Union
DPEU6b	How much do you trust the: European Parliament
DPEU6c	How much do you trust the: European Council
DPEU6d	How much do you trust the: European Commission
DPEU6e	How much do you trust the: European Central Bank
DPEU6f	How much do you trust the: Eurogroup
DPEU7	All in all, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?
DPEU8	Are you in favour or against the following EU policies? b: A common foreign policy of the 28 member states of the EU, d:A common defence and security policy among EU member states, e: he EU's common trade policy, f: A common European policy on migration, g: A common energy policy among EU member states, h: A digital single market within the EU.
DPEU9a	European integration is a threat for Greece's cultural identity.
DPEU9b	European Union has strengthened democracy.
DPEU9c	European Union caused too much harm to Greek economy.
DPEU10a	European Union should have a greater say in member states' fiscal policies.
DPEU10b	It is better for Greece to stay within Eurozone.

First, we have two items (DPEU1, DPEU2) that has been included in almost every survey trying to measure attitudes towards EU (Eurobarometer, European Election Studies

etc). Either both or at least one of these two items has/have been used in most of the publications on Euroscepticism as the main dependent variable (e.g. Hakhverdian et al., 2013; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; Serricchio et al., 2013). Lubbers & Scheepers (2005, 2010) use a combination of these two items to measure what they call instrumental euroscepticism which is based on the citizens' perceptions regarding the benefits of the EU membership for their particular country.

European unification items with various wordings has appeared in many surveys since 1971 (Franklin & Wlezien, 1997). We have included an item (DPEU3) regarding European unification that has been used in the questionnaire the European Election Studies and the European Social Survey. This item has also been used as the dependent variable in different publications regarding euroscepticism (e.g. Defacqz et al., 2019; Schoene, 2019; van Elsas et al., 2016).

We also use an item related to European identity (DPEU4) that has been included in Eurobarometer surveys. A similar item has been used by Lubbers and Scheepers (2010) who have shown that older European citizens and citizens of lower socioeconomic status tend to identify less with the EU. European identity has also been tested by Weßels (2007) as a strong predictor of euroscepticism. DPEU5 is another item related to European identity that has been used in the European Candidate Survey.

Trust towards EU institutions have been used as an indicator of euroscepticism (van Elsas et al., 2016). For this reason, we have used the DPEU6 battery of items related to trust towards EU institutions. Dissatisfaction with the current functioning of democracy in EU has also been used as euroscepticism indicator (van Elsas et al., 2016). Thus we have included the DPEU7.

Then we included some items related to what Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) has defined as "political euroscepticism". For the measurement of political euroscepticism they have used responses given by survey participants to a question included in a series of eurobarometers (up to Eurobarometer 30.0, which was collected in 2000) with the following wording: "Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union", followed by a series of policy areas that were displayed to the participants, and they were asked to indicate their preference if their national government or jointly the EU should decide about each of them. During the last two decades Eurobarometer respondents face a different question but related to attitudes towards common EU policies with the following wording: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it." followed by a list of statements regarding common EU

policies. We have opted to include in the DataPopEU questionnaire the DPEU8 battery of items which appear in the more recent Eurobarometer questionnaires. Finally, we have included a battery of items (DPEU9) that have been used in European Candidates Surveys, that have been designed to collect data on the attitudes of candidates to the European Parliament and two new items (DPEU10). These items represent clearly anti-EU stances.

2.4 Data Analysis

We start our analysis by exploring if the populist attitudes items can be used to construct a uni-dimensional scale. We apply Mokken scale analysis (van Schuur, 2003) using the R package *mokken* (van der Ark, 2012). Most of the items construct a uni-dimensional scale, but there are two pairs of items that belong to different scales and three items that are not associated with any of the other items we have used. We start with the evaluation of the four items of the former group and we continue with the three items in the latter group.

All items that belong to different scales come from the Team Populism Battery (Castanho Silva et al., 2019) :

- [TP1] Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.
- [TP2] Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.
- [TP7] You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.
- [TP8] The people I disagree with politically are not evil.

The first two of them refer to the idea of people-centrism and the other two the idea of Manichean outlook. The failure of these items to fit in the same dimension along with the other items you have used, is easily explained if we take into account the method followed by Castanho Silva et al, who wanted to capture different dimensions of populism “that can be seen as separate constructs and should, accordingly, be measured separately” and they have not examined if the three separate constructs they have suggested can be used together to construct a second order scale. In fact, the low correlation coefficients reported in their findings indicate that a second order construct would be very weak. Thus, there are voters who would fully agree with a statement from one of the three dimensions while they fully disagree with the statements of another dimension. For instance, there are voters who would fully agree with “Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people” because they seek more responsiveness from elected officials, while they still have positive attitudes towards the elites. Along the same lines, the Manichean outlook can be a characteristic of other ideologies. For instance, an elitist or anti-populist voter could think of the people as the absolute evil, scoring high on the Manichean dimension while scoring low in the anti-elite dimension. In general, the three Team Populism components should be regarded as non-compensatory (i.e. higher values on one component cannot offset lower values on another) and the general precautions offer by Wuttke et al. (2020) should be taken into account. This is important to the extent that it may relate to problems with operationalizing the moralistic outlook of populism.

We continue with one Team Populism item that is not associated with the other items we have used: TP9. The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed. As (Castanho Silva et al., 2019) mention in their chapter while the first two items of their Manichean outlook construct (TP7 and TP8) refer to people's good or bad intentions, this item taps into the competence of individuals and as a result the first two items are expected to work better because "the Manichaeon view on politics is basically a view which refers to people's intentions".

Another item that is not associated with any of the other items we have used is one of the CSES items: [Q04e] Having a strong leader in government is good for Greece even if the leader bends the rules to get things done. The failure of the specific item to form a unidimensional scale with other populist items is compatible with previous research findings (Andreadis et al., 2018) The roots of this item may lie within the ideas of Canovan work who assumed that the united people may have a preference for a strong leader (1999, p. 5):

"A vision of 'the people' as a united body implies impatience with party strife, and can encourage support for strong leadership where a charismatic individual is available to personify the interests of the nation"

but the way it is expressed in Q04e (i.e. bending the rules) makes the item more suitable for an authoritarian scale rather than for a populist attitudes scale. Thus, it is expected to be supported by right-wing populists and other radical right voters (e.g. Donovan, 2021) but many left-wing populists would not feel comfortable with the idea of a strong leader who bends the rules. Besides, many self-professed 'liberals' might also agree with that (strong leadership) and don't we always hear about the need for strong leadership from many unconnected sectors?

In addition, as Greaves and Vowles (2020) point out, as this question is double—barreled some people may pay attention to the first part only; in this case they may respond that they agree with it because they would like to have a strong leader, disregarding the second part of the statement and the reference to a leader who bends rules.

Finally, the last of the items that have failed in our MSA check for a unidimensional scale is SAK8: "Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making". This item has worked well together with other populist items in ELNES 2015; it seems that the item was more meaningful then, because of the negotiations between the Greek government and European officials regarding the austerity measures and the bailout agreements and the high level of polarization in the Greek political arena but in ELNES 2019 this issue is less salient and although this item is still correlated with other populist attitudes items, these correlations are weaker and eventually the item fails to enter the unidimensional scale, probably due to changes of the level of polarization in Greece.




Figure 6-1 Distribution of the populist attitudes index


All the other items, construct a uni-dimensional scale ($H=0.414$) and we can use the arithmetic mean of these items to create a populist attitudes index. The distribution of this index is almost symmetrical, with very low levels of Skewness (-0.19) and Kurtosis (-0.22), i.e. very similar to a Normal distribution (Figure 6-1). The mean value is 3.6 and the standard deviation is 0.62. The median value is identical to the mean value (3.6), indicating that half of the respondents have a populism index score that is greater than or equal to 3.6. In addition, one out of four respondents has a populism index score greater than 4 and another one out of four has a score that is less than 3.2.

Before testing the Euroscepticism items through Mokken Scale Analysis we have to change the scale from some of them, because MSA does not work well when the tests items have different scales. Given that in most of our items a 5-point likert scale has been used we have gone through the following data transformations.² Then, we apply Mokken scale analysis

² i) we take the sum of all binary items in DPEU8 and then we transform the result into the [1-5] scale making sure that 5 indicates the pro-EU position, ii) we convert both DPEU1 and DPEU2 from a 3-

using again the R package mokken. Most of the items construct a unidimensional scale. Only two of the items are not associated with any of the other items we have used for euroscepticism: DPEU3 and DPEU9a.

Regarding the failure of DPEU3 (about the direction of EU unification), this is not a surprise. While most of the other items are designed to catch how the respondents evaluate EU as it is (static views), this item according to Rose and Borz (2016) is a measurement of which direction EU unification should follow in the future according to the respondents (dynamic views). Dynamic views may vary a lot among people who have the same static view. Especially within the people who dislike the current state of the EU, some may favour further measures of integration; others seek less integration, and others may not even care about the future of EU unification because they want their country to withdraw from the EU (in this case they may not answer the question, or they may pick the middle point of the scale). Figure 6-2 depicts very clearly the large variation of responses to the EU unification question among the respondents who think that the EU membership is a bad thing for Greece.



point scale to a 5-point scale (leaving points 2 and 4 empty) and making sure that 5 indicates the pro-EU position to , iii) we convert DPEU3 from a 11-point scale to a 5-point scale (rounding to integer values when this is necessary), iv) we convert both DPEU4 and DPEU7 from a 4-point scale to a 5-point scale (leaving point 3 empty) and making sure that 5 indicates the pro-EU position and v) we reverse the negative-worded DPEU9b

Figure 6-2 Distribution of EU unification per EU membership evaluation

The second item that had been excluded by the uni-dimensional scale is DPEU9a which is very similar to one of the items that according to Boomgaarden et al (2011) is part of the so called “negative affection dimension of EU attitudes”, which according to their hypothesis that was verified by their data, is strongly affected by anti-immigration attitudes. In our opinion, this item reflects mostly nationalist, anti-immigrant attitudes which may be modestly correlated with items that indicate a more general negative stance against EU. Figure 6-3 shows that although European citizens who evaluate EU membership as a good thing tend to disagree more with the idea that EU is a threat for their cultural identity, the boxplots of the other two groups (bad thing and neither/nor) is identical, meaning that beliefs of EU as a threat to cultural identity are very weakly related with more general EU evaluations.




Figure 6-3 EU membership evaluations and distribution of EU as a threat for cultural identity

Comparing our results with the five dimensions suggested by Boomgarden et al, we have found that the dimension called “Strength” is indeed something different from the other euroscepticism items. In this respect, we agree with other scholars who argue that the most usual item (and most of the other items) pertaining to the strength dimension refers to attitudes on how EU should be developed in the future while the other dimensions refer to attitudes towards the current state of EU. In addition, we have shown that this item is very weakly correlated with a more general evaluation of the current state of EU because those who are dissatisfied with the current state may demand more or less EU integration with almost equal probabilities for both of these preferences for the future of EU. We have also found that one of

the items that is related to the dimension “Negative Affection” does not fit with the other euroscepticism items in a unidimensional scale. However, we argue that these items capture mostly “fear of immigrants and thus, they related more to right-wing anti-immigrant stances and not euroscepticism per se. Moreover, this characteristic might be more associated euroscepticism that appears more in the richer EU countries that attract economic immigrants from other EU countries and as such may be less relevant in the Southern periphery and especially in Greece where eurosceptic stances of citizens may be more related to the economic recession.




Figure 6-4 Distribution of Euro-scepticism

The items that are related to the rest three dimensions highlighted by Boomgarden et al –Utilitarianism (EU membership is good thing and benefit), Performance (trust in EU institutions and SWD) and Identity –are, in our opinion, strongly interconnected and constitute one unified structure. Especially for European Identity that has been suggested as a predictor of the other dimensions (Teperoglou & Belchior, 2020; Weßels, 2007), we argue that the direction of effects between these three dimensions is not clear. For instance, citizens who believe that the EU is beneficial for them and their country or those who are satisfied with EU performance may feel more proud about being a European citizen and gradually develop a European identity. People who are satisfied with how democracy works in EU will also think that EU membership is a good thing. Given the multiple direction and the strength of the effects

among these three dimensions, we think that it makes sense to consider them as parts of the same unidimensional scale.

Thus, it is not a surprise that after excluding the EU unification and the cultural threat items, all the other items construct a unidimensional scale that is more strongly connected than the populist attitudes scale ($H=0.588$) and we can use the (reversed) arithmetic mean of these items to create a euroscepticism index. The distribution of this index is almost symmetrical, with very low levels of Skewness (0.27) and Kurtosis (-0.29), i.e. very similar to a Normal distribution (Figure 6-4). The mean value is 3.11 and the standard deviation is 0.77. The median value is almost identical to the mean value (3), indicating that half of the respondents have a euroscepticism index score that is greater or equal to 3. In addition, one out of four respondents has a euroscepticism index score greater than 3.625 and another one out of four has a score that is less than 2.533.

In an attempt to study the correlation between populism and euroscepticism, one of our main findings, as Figure 6-5 shows, is that these two indices are positively and strongly correlated. The correlation coefficient is $R=0.577$ between euroscepticism and populism indices. At this point, we are not arguing about a strict causal relationship, and we will avoid presenting a casual (e.g. linear regression) model that will facilitate the prediction of one of these indices by the other. Although, we might argue that populist attitudes could probably be used as a predictor of euroscepticism, our scope in this paper is restricted in studying the correlation of these two indices without entering into a discussion about causes and effects.




Figure 6-5 Scatterplot between Euroscepticism and Populism

However, there are some factors that can modify the strength of this correlation (i.e. should be used as additional independent variables along with the interaction terms if we wish to proceed to a linear regression model).




Figure 6-6 Correlation of Euroscepticism - Populism per Political Interest

As we can see in Figure 6-6, the positive correlation between populism and euroscepticism is stronger when political interest is high (for instance in the group of people who are very interested in politics (0.68) and it drops as the levels of interest are dropping) As a result of this drop, we observe that among people who are not at all interested in politics the correlation coefficient drops to 0.43 . A more careful observation of the diagrams in Figure 6-6 shows that although in the group of people who are very interested, there is a large variability for both indices as the interest drops, the variability decreases. For instance, in the “Not at all interested” group, almost everyone scores high on the populist attitudes scale and most of them score high on the euroscepticism scale.

The evaluation of the performance of the previous government has a very significant impact on the correlation between populism and euroscepticism. As it is shown in Figure 6-7, the more negative voters are for the job of the previous government the higher the correlation coefficients. The correlation coefficient is significantly lower in the group of voters who think that the previous government has done a very good job ($r=0.17$). In this group of people, we can observe that the levels of populism have no effect on euroscepticism, which remains stable

(indicated by the almost horizontal slop of the line in the corresponding diagram of Figure 6-7) and independent of the populism dimension.




Figure 6-7 Correlation of Euroscepticism - Populism per Government Performance

In order to explain this relationship and given that the evaluation of the previous government is expected to be higher among the voters of the party that was in the government, we present in Figure 6-8 how the correlation between populism and euroscepticism varies among the voters of each party. The diagrams in Figure 6-8 show that in the group of SYRIZA voters, the correlation between populism and euroscepticism is much lower ($r=0.29$) than in the groups of the voters of other parties. Among SYRIZA voters the attitudes towards EU are much less related to populist attitudes. As a result, although in other parties, high scores on the populism index correspond to high scores on the euroscepticism index, this relationship is not so strong among SYRIZA voters. This could be related to the inclusionary characteristics of left-wing populism (but we do not observe something similar among MERA25 voters) or it could be related to the ambivalent stance of SYRIZA towards EU during the last decade.




Figure 6-8 Correlation of Euroscepticism - Populism per Party

2.5 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we aimed to analyze a series of items which are used in the DATAPOPEU surveys to measure populist attitudes and euroscepticism. Our main conclusions are as follows:

Populist attitudes items that have been designed to capture the different dimensions of populism as separate constructs (such as “people-centrism” and the “Manichean outlook” in Team Populism), which use a wording that does not include any references to anti-elite attitudes, may not be related to populist attitudes, e.g. we may find voters who score very high on these dimensions and at the same time the same voters may score low on the anti-elite dimension. These components should be regarded as non-compensatory and should not be used to construct a unidimensional populist attitudes scale. We have also verified, once more, that (at least in Greece) the CSES item about the strong leader who bends the rules does not work well as an item belonging to a populist attitudes battery.

Regarding euroscepticism, we have been able to verify that items that refer to the direction of EU unification (in the future) belong to a separate dimension of euroscepticism from most euroscepticism items, which are designed to catch how the respondents evaluate EU as it is. We have also shown that among the people who dislike the current state of the EU there is a very large variation of preferences regarding the future direction of EU unification. We have also shown that most of the other euroscepticism items are strongly interconnected and constitute a unidimensional structure. Furthermore, our findings confirm that most of the other dimensions that have been suggested in the past are strongly correlated and we argue that

people with high scores in one of them are likely to have an almost equally high score in the others (e.g. people who are satisfied with how democracy works in EU will also think that EU membership is a good thing).

Finally, regarding the relationship between populism and euroscepticism, we found that they are strongly and positively correlated (increased populism goes together with increased euroscepticism). This correlation may be moderated by other factors, such as political interest and party preference. Among Greek voters, we have found that this correlation is much lower in the group of SYRIZA voters, and we have tried to offer some possible explanations for this observation.

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
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3 Comparison among the parliamentary elections of 2015 and 2019

3.1 Comparison left-right placement in elections of 2015 and 2019

According to the following figure, we observe a significant distance between voters and candidates of the left-wing party of the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA). In addition, the other political parties have a close distance among attitudes of voters and candidates in the left-right self replacement. Moreover, the level of congruence between the candidates and the voters of the center-right party of New Democracy (ND) appears to be high. In 2015 another party that had a high level of congruence was River, despite it is a new party in the Greek party system. On the other hand, we observe a large distance between SYRIZA voters and SYRIZA candidates on the L/R axis in 2015. In addition, the ECDFs of the candidates and voters of PASOK show a marked distance especially in 2015. Therefore, we can observe a higher incongruence between candidates and voters on the left-right dimension in the left-wing political party of SYRIZA, where the candidates are more likely to adopt a more extreme position to the left of the scale than the voters.

ECDFs: GREECE 2015



Focusing on 2019 elections, according to the above notices, we still observe a significant distance between the candidates and the voters of SYRIZA and KINAL. Also, a considerable distance is observed between the candidates and voters of MERA25. The aforementioned observations support the evidence of the previous years that candidates of the left-wing parties place themselves more to the left in the L/R scale compared to their voters. Moreover, the level of congruence between the candidates and the voters of ND appears to be lower in 2019 than it was in 2012 or 2015. Moreover, the party that exhibits a high level of congruence is EL,

although it is a new party in the Greek party system. Finally, in the elections of 2019, there were not the parties of RIVER and ANEL, but the new political parties of MERA 25 and Greek Solution entered into the Greek Parliament.


3.2 Comparison populism in elections of 2015 and 2019

Firstly, it is worth to note that in the Questionnaire of 2015 Elections we have not question about euroscepticism, so we cannot study this phenomenon comparatively. We have already seen that congruence encompasses a salient connection between citizens and political elites either on particular policy preferences or on broader ideological issues (Dolny and Babos 2015: 1276; O'Leary 2014). When moving from the former level to the latter one encounters ideological positions that are not constrained by the main dimension of contestation in European politics, the left/right dimension' (Costello et al. 2012: 1227, 1231). According to Costello et al., together with euroscepticism, populism belongs to this category. Now, in the literature on populism it has already been shown that both the elites (supply side) and the voters (demand side) of parties that are identified as 'populist' have specific populist attitudes that may be quantitatively measured: this is done by using their responses to a battery of populist attitudes items in order to create a populism index for each respondent. The first version of populist attitudes items have been developed by Kirk Hawkins and Scott Riding (2010). The same datasets and a similar analysis were used later in a paper by Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012). Building on the aforementioned studies, Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013) have tested a battery of items to measure populist attitudes and to investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences in the Dutch case. The way we have chosen to formulate our questions attempts to facilitate further an evolving dialogue between this 'new mainstream' in populism studies and a discursive approach based on 'minimal criteria' and inspired by the Essex School (Laclau 2005a; Townshend 2003; Stavrakakis et al. 2016; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014).



We measure the populism voter/candidate congruence. Figure 6 shows that in the elections of 2015 the candidates of SYRIZA, PASOK and ND are slightly less populist than their voters, while the candidates of ANEL are slightly more populists than their voters. However, the distances are very small and they cannot be deemed as significant. In the elections of 2015,

as we can see in Figure 6, there is congruence between populist attitudes of voters and candidates of SYRIZA, ANEL, PASOK and ND parties in general.

Figure 6: Populist Attitudes ECDFs for SYRIZA, ANEL, PASOK and ND



Comparing the last two diagrams, we observe that the left-wing party of SYRIZA, while in 2015 elections had high level of populism, in the 2019 elections, this level decreased. Although, in 2019 the new entries in the Parliament, Greek Solution and MERA 25, had an increased level of populism from all the other parties. Additionally, the party of ANEL had the highest level of populism in 2015 Elections. Another notice is that New Democracy (ND) had low level of populism in both of the elections and especially in the 2019 elections as well as the RIVER party in 2015 elections. Finally, the center-right party of PASOK had remained in the same level of populism in both of the elections.



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4 PopEUCompass: Expert Survey and Users

4.1 Expert survey

Many voting advice applications present the results as a list of parties ranked according to their proximity with the voter, other VAAs provide both a ranked list and a diagram, and some offer only a diagram (Louwerse & Rosema, 2014). Both outputs are useful: the ranked list displays the party that according to the theory of issue voting should be voter's first choice at the top of the list and the parties that promote policies that are against the political views of the voter at the bottom of the list. The diagram usually displays the voter's position and the position of the parties on a political map and users are able to observe their distance from the parties on each dimension of the map.

PopEUCompass displays the results both with a ranked list of parties and with three political maps: i) Sociocultural issues – Euroscepticism (Figure 1), ii) Sociocultural issues –Populism (Figure 2), and iii) Populism - Euroscepticism (Figure 3)




Figure 1 Map of Sociocultural issues and Euroscepticism




Figure 2 Map of Sociocultural issues – Populism

Figure 2 Map of Sociocultural issues – Populism




Figure 3 Map of Populism - Euroscepticism

All of the statements used in PopEUCompass have been classified according to their political orientation: if a statement expresses a sociocultural left position (i.e. a position with which a left party would probably agree) is classified as left-oriented (value of -1 on the x axis). With the same method, other statements have been classified as right-oriented (value of 1 on the x axis).

The position of a voter (as well as the position of the parties) on the diagram is determined by the following procedure: First, since voters have the option of not answering some questions and because the position in the diagram is meaningful only if they have answered most of the questions, the number of questions that have been answered by the voter is checked and the chart is displayed only if the user has given many answers. The answers are coded as follows: -1: Strongly disagree, -0.5: Disagree, 0: Neither agree nor disagree, 0.5: Agree and 1: Strongly agree. Then, to determine the position of the voter on the Left - Right axis, we sum the codes of all the answers to questions that are right-oriented and subtract the codes of all responses to questions that are left oriented. Then, the result is divided by the number of responses given to all left or right oriented questions. The result is a number with values ranging from -1 (extreme left) to +1 (extreme right) and used as the abscissa of the voter. In a similar way we find the position of the voter/parties on the other two axes.

After completing the expert surveys, we have used the new knowledge attained by the DataPopEU project to create a political compass about populism and euroscepticism named after the acronym of the proposed project (PopEUCompass). In this compass, citizens can find out where they stand when it comes to populism and to euroscepticism, observe their proximity or remoteness to populist and eurosceptic parties and they are encouraged to visit the website of the project to learn more about the most important aspects of populism and euroscepticism.

PopEUCompass relies on Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) and more specifically on HelpMeVote. VAAs are web applications that enable voters to compare their political views with the views of the political parties. Voting Advice Applications have been used in many countries for presidential, parliamentary, regional or municipal elections. In Greece, the Voting

Advice Application HelpMeVote (<http://helpmevote.gr>) was first tested for the regional elections of 2010 and since then it has been used for all general elections until today.

PopEUCompass, unlike VAAs, is not linked to a specific pre-election period, but it is available to the public on a continuous basis. Despite this difference, we can use the same steps that are used to create a VAA. Therefore, the following steps should be followed: i) selection of issues ii) selection of parties and coding of parties on the selected issues, iii) calculation of distance or similarity between parties and voters and iv) presentation of the results.

Scholars use different methods of estimating the party positions such as literature review and analysis of party manifestos as well as public opinion surveys, elite studies and, more recently, expert surveys. Expert surveys are widely used by scholars for decades to estimate party positions in a multitude of political dimensions, such as party placement in a left-right scale (Castles & Mair, 1984; Huber & Inglehart, 1995), European integration (Ray, 1999) or economic and social-ethical dimensions (Benoit & Laver, 2006).


More recently, several expert surveys about populism and euroscepticism have appeared like Chapel Hill Surveys (Polk et al., 2017). The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) uses the opinion of experts on the positioning of political parties in many countries in Europe. The 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, in addition to two items designed to measure populism already present in CHES since 2014 (anti-elite and anti-corruption), also includes a new item on people-centrism. In the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 228 experts estimated the positions of 132 parties in 14 countries in Europe. Each national expert was asked to reflect on the position of the leadership of the parties presented to the experts with their abbreviations and full names, in the country language and in English. The introduction of the questionnaire, in fact, clarifies what the Chapel Hill researchers mean when they refer to the leadership of the parties (party's chair, the party presidium, and the parliamentary party, as distinct from the party base or local and regional party officials). Then for a series of dimensions the questionnaire includes three items: i) position, ii) clarity and iii) salience. In addition to euroscepticism and populism, the 2017 CHES questionnaire incorporates items that can be

used to estimate the position of political parties on the following dimensions: i) economic left/right and ii) libertarian vs authoritarian (socio-cultural issues).


For PopEUCompass, we included the parties that are represented in the Greek Parliament. In DataPopEU, we have conducted two expert surveys to estimate the ideological positions of the main Greek political parties with respect to populist and eurosceptic issues. The data of the first expert survey have been used in order to build the initial version of PopEUCompass and the data of the second expert survey have been used to build the final version of PopEUCompass. Table 1, shows the position of each political party on each statement.

4.2 PopEUCompass Users

In addition, we compare the correlation among populist and eurosceptic attitudes in the following two diagrams, the first one is about Elnes Study and the second one is about PopEUCompass. More specifically, in the first figure, as we can see, there is an intense correlation between populism and euroscepticism, because the correlation coefficient is high ($R=0.58$). Although, in the same diagram, there are not points of extreme populist and eurosceptic attitudes. Moreover we conclude that it is possible for someone to be both europeanist and populist, but there is no case, someone to be slightly populist and very eurosceptic.



On the other hand, in the second following diagram we observe that there is not so intense high correlation between populism and euroscepticism, because the correlation coefficient is lower than the previous figure ($R=0.44$). Specifically, someone who is populist, it is possible to be eurosceptic at the same time. Furthermore, the low correlation coefficient maybe is related to the different way of answering the Questionnaires of PopEUCompass and Elnes Study from the users. Another observation, is that the respondents of PopEUCompass did not pay the appropriate attention in questions during the response procedure. Finally, the aforementioned notice is under investigation in order to export certain results.



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